A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in Electricity Networks – Theory, Modeling and Application by Rosellon, Juan & Weigt, Hannes
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for
Transmission Expansion in Electricity
Networks – Theory, Modeling and
Application
Juan Rosellon and Hannes Weigt
2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22843/
MPRA Paper No. 22843, posted 21. May 2010 19:26 UTC
A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in 
Electricity Networks – Theory, Modeling and Application1
JUAN ROSELLÓN  
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) and University of Technology 
Dresden (TU Dresden) 
AND
HANNES WEIGT 
University of Technology Dresden (TU Dresden) 
Abstract
This paper examines the Hogan-Rosellón-Vogelsang (2007) (HRV) incentive mechanism for 
transmission expansion, and tests it for different network topologies. This new mechanism is based 
upon redefining transmission output in terms of point-to-point transactions or financial transmission 
rights (FTRs) and applies Vogelsang’s (2001) incentive-regulation logic that proposes rebalancing the 
variable and fixed parts of a two-part tariff to promote efficient, long-term expansion. We analyze 
three main topics: first, the behavior of cost functions for distinct network topologies; second, the 
HRV regulatory approach (incorporated into an MPEC Problem and tested for a three-node network), 
and third an application to a simplified network. The results suggest that the mechanism is generally 
suited as an incentive tool for network extensions. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This paper analyzes a new tool for transmission expansion called the Hogan-Rosellón-Vogelsang
(2007) (HRV) incentive mechanism. It is based upon redefining the output of transmission in terms of 
point-to-point transactions or financial transmission rights (FTRs) and applies the incentive-regulation
logic in Vogelsang (2001) that proposes rebalancing the variable and fixed parts of a two-part tariff to 
promote efficient, long-term expansion. Roughly speaking, Vogelsang (2001) is by its nature relevant
for radial networks only, while HRV is designed to deal with expansions within meshed networks. 
Efficient transmission extension is one of the main concerns in restructured electricity markets around 
the world. In the US, network congestion is managed according to the different existing electric power
systems. In regions with vertically integrated utilities, where restructuring has not taken place, a 
procedure which physically manages constraints by rationing access to portions of the transmission
network is used. This procedure is known as transmission loading relief (TLR). Other areas in the US 
function under Independent System Operators (ISO) or Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO), 
which generally use market-based methods to manage congestion and promote the expansion of the
network.2 In both types of systems, congestion problems have arisen, in particular since the beginning
of restructuring. The frequency of TLRs has risen considerably; this was particularly the case in the 
Midwest (Dyer, 2003). In other regions, too, congestion costs have increased, such as in the PJM,
Southern Connecticut and New England markets. The Department of Energy (2006) identifies two 
critical congestion areas in economic important regions for the US: the Atlantic coastal area from
metropolitan New York southward through Northern Virginia, and Southern California. Furthermore,
four congestion areas of concern have been identified: New England, the Phoenix – Tucson area, the
Seattle - Portland area, and the San Francisco Bay area. Transmission investment has declined during
several recent periods (Joskow, 2005). The US regulator, FERC, has suggested policies on
transmission investment based on the use of merchant transmission mechanisms, but not much effort 
has been carried out to apply performance-based regulatory mechanisms. Implementation of
regulatory measures by the regulatory authority is further complicated by the duality of attributions at
the federal and state levels.3
Developing sufficient network extensions, particularly cross border capacities, is also urgently needed
in Europe. Due to the liberalization processes initiated in the late 1990s, existing national electricity 
networks with limited cross-border capacities now form the backbone of the emerging European-wide
2 RTOs schedule and dispatch generators on regional networks, allocate scarce transmission capacity, monitor
generators, coordinate maintenance to transmission networks, plan ways to develop new transmission links, and
operate real time and diverse time-ahead markets for energy and ancillary services.
3 The states are responsible for reviewing applications for major new transmission facilities, granting permits and
regulating charges for bundled transmission service charged by vertically integrated firms to retail customers.
FERC is responsible for regulating the prices for transmission service, but has in general no authority over
transmission planning.
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internal market. However, the grid remains segmented into several regional and national sub-
networks, resulting in little or no competition between countries, and the region as a whole is 
experiencing more congestion. The diverging policy approaches suggested for regulating transmission
and managing congestion further complicate the development of a functioning electricity market. In
addition, the expected capacity increase in renewables (primarily offshore and onshore wind) will 
require significant transmission investment. Although several studies have proposed ambitious
extension schedules for the existing grid (e.g. Dena, 2005), an economical-technical approach that can
cope with the increasing need for expansion while simultaneously accounting for welfare effects has 
not yet been designed. We propose that the HRV incentive mechanism is ideally suited to addressing 
these concerns.
After a brief theoretical overview, our paper is divided into three sections. First, we carry out a 
theoretical analysis of the cost function behavior of transmission expansion with simple structures
(such as three-node meshed networks), and then extend them to more complex topologies. We focus 
on two basic cases: line capacities are adjusted, but nodes, lines, impedances and thus the power 
transmission distribution factors (PTDFs) do not change. Subsequently, we single out the effect of 
loop flows on costs by considering switched networks of the same topology (allowing for changes in
line impedances that are correlated with line capacities) under several scale assumptions. These cases
provide insights about the relationship between PTDFs and network topology size and shape. Second, 
we apply the HRV incentive mechanism to the theoretical network used for the first part of our cost-
analysis to derive the general behavior of such a mechanism. We test the same differentiations made
for the cost function analysis under the regulatory regime. Third, we apply the new incentive 
mechanism to a simplified grid (Germany, the Benelux and France) to test whether the theoretical
conclusions we obtained are consistent with the application to a real-world situation. 
1.2 Survey of the Literature 
The two distinct theories of transmission investment take either a merchant approach (long-run
financial rights to transmission, LTFTR), or a regulatory approach (incentive-regulation hypothesis).
The first is based on LTFTR auctions by an independent system operator (ISO). This approach is also
known as a merchant mechanism because the participation of economic agents in auctions is 
voluntary. It addresses loop-flow externalities by having the ISO retain some unallocated transmission
rights (or proxy FTRs) during the LTFTR auction to protect FTR holders from the negative 
externalities of transmission expansion projects (Kristiansen and Rosellon, 2006). This is equivalent to 
having the agents responsible for externalities “pay” them back (Bushnell and Stoft, 1997) so that 
when FTR contracts exactly match dispatch, welfare cannot be reduced through gaming.
The regulatory approach involves a commercial transmission company (Transco) that is regulated 
through benchmark regulation or price regulation to provide long-term investment incentives while 
avoiding congestion. Some mechanisms suggest comparing the Transco’s performance with a measure
of welfare loss (Léautier, 2000, Grande and Wangesteen, 2000, and Joskow and Tirole, 2002).
Another regulatory variation is the two-part tariff cap proposed by Vogelsang (2001), where incentives 
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for investment in expanding the grid derive from the rebalancing of the fixed and variable portions of 
the tariff. Vogelsang postulates transmission cost and demand functions with fairly general properties
and then adapts regulatory adjustment processes to the electricity transmission problem. For example,
under well-behaved cost and demand functions, appropriate weights (such as Laspeyres weights) grant 
convergence to equilibrium conditions.4 A particular criticism of this approach has been that the
properties of transmission cost and demand functions are little known but are suspected to differ from 
conventional functional forms. Hence Vogelsang’s assumed cost and demand properties may actually
not hold in a real network context with loop-flows. Furthermore, a conventional linear definition of the 
transmission output is in fact difficult since the physical flow through a meshed transmission network
is complex and highly interdependent among transactions (Bushnell and Stoft, 1997, and Hogan, 
2002a, 2002b).
The new HRV mechanism combines the merchant and regulatory approaches in an environment of 
price-taking generators and loads. It is an extension of Vogelsang (2001) for meshed projects. It is 
designed for Transcos but – as in the Vogelsang (2001) model – it could also be applied to an ISO
setting. Transmission output is redefined in terms of incremental LTFTRs in order to apply the 
Vogelsang incentive mechanism to a meshed network. The Transco maximizes profits intertemporally,
subject to a price cap constraint on its two-part tariff, and the choice variables are the fixed and the 
variable fees. The fixed part of the tariff plays the role of a complementary charge. The variable part
of the tariff is the price of the FTR output, and is then based on nodal prices. Pricing for the different
cost components of transmission do not conflict (fixed costs are allocated so that the variable charges 
are able to reflect nodal prices). Thus, variations in fixed charges over time partially counteract the
variability of nodal prices, giving some price insurance to the market participants.
The scientific results of the HRV modelso far show convergence to marginal-cost pricing under
idealized weights, while under Laspeyres weights there is evidence of such a convergence in more
restrictive conditions.5,6 Likewise, transmission cost functions are shown to have very normal
economic properties in a variety of circumstances. This holds, in particular, if the topology of all
nodes and links is given and only the capacity of lines can be changed, which implies that unusually
behaved cost functions require a change in the network topology.
4 See Rosellón (2007) for an application of the Vogelsang (2001) model to an electricity network with no loop
flows.
5 Laspeyres weights are easily calculated and have shown nice economic properties under stable cost and
demand conditions. Idealized weights correspond to perfectly predicted quantities and possess strong efficiency
properties (see Laffont and Tirole, 1996, and Ramírez and Rosellón, 2002).
6 Under Laspeyres weights (and assuming that cross-derivatives have the same sign), prices will intertemporally
converge to marginal costs if goods are complementary and prices are initially above marginal costs.. When
goods are substitutes, this effect is only obtained if the cross-effects are smaller than the direct effects. The
opposite results are obtained if prices are below marginal costs.
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2 Cost function behavior of transmission expansion
2.1 Outline
In this section we derive properties for electricity transmission cost functions. We identify types of 
network topologies where the expansion project derives from well- (or ill-) behaved transmission cost 
functions. In the first case, the expansion is such that only line capacities are adjusted, but nodes, lines, 
impedances and thus the PTDFs do not change. In the second case, the expansion considers switched 
networks of the same topology, allowing for changes in PTDFs and under several scale assumptions.
Our analysis of cost functions relies on a “translation” of the HRV’s theoretical cost model into an 
empirically testable model. The HRV cost model defines cost function as the minimum costs
necessary to produce each level of the FTR output subject to constraints on feasibility and on the
relationship between FTR obligations and net injections:
       (1))(min)(
,
ji
ji
ij
k
kfFTRC
i

s.t. -H*q  k          (2)
q = FTR*e (3)
with
FTR = [qij] matrix of balanced point-to-point FTRs
q = vector of net injections
k = vector of line capacities 
fij(kij) = cost of extending the capacity kij of the line connecting i and j7
e = a vector of ones 
H = PTDF matrix
-H*q = vector of line flows
The objective of our model is to satisfy a given combination of FTRs by estimating the least-cost
capacity extension. Due to the loop-flow characteristics of electricity networks, an increased injection 
at one node may result in a decreased capacity requirement for specific lines. In the second case of our 
study, capacity extensions are linked to changes in the lines impedance resulting in a transformation of 
the grid’s PTDF. Thus whenever the capacity value of one line is changed the entire power flow 
within the grid differs and may cause congestion elsewhere.
Our goal is to derive a “global” cost function in terms of the individual lines’ costs. This is achieved
by allowing one FTR output to move while keeping the others constant for the varied assumptions we 
make about the shape of individual-line cost functions.
7 Hereafter referred to as “extension function” whereas C(FTR) is referred to as “cost function”. 
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2.2 Model approach 
We incorporate the approach described into GAMS as a non-linear minimization problem, with the 
overall grid extension costs as an objective function. We use the DC Load Flow model to calculate
power flows. Based on the assumption that real power flows are determined according to the 
differences of the voltage angles between two nodes, we can model the real flow by focusing only on
the voltage angle differences (Stigler and Todem, 2005, and Schweppe et al., 1988). Doing so will 
avoid having to recalculate the PTDF matrix when changing a single line parameter since the line’s
reactance is already part of the flow formulation
(4)ijijij BP 
with
Pij = real power flow between i and j 
ij = voltage angle difference between i and j 
Bij = line series susceptance 


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For the specific capacity extensions represented by the functions fij(kij), we test three different forms 
corresponding to the constant, increasing and decreasing returns to scale:
 Linear function: ckaf ijijij 
 Quadratic function: ckaf ijijij 
2
 Logarithmic function:   ckbaf ijijijij  ln
The values of a and b have been varied for different scenarios, and c is assumed to be 0. A realistic
line extension function may be a combination of the three modeled cases (although linear extension 
costs are commonly used). We note the possibility of lumpiness of investments and spikes within the
extension functions (e.g. due to a change in voltage level) (see also Section 2.3.3). 
Our initial grid topology comprises a three-node network with two generation nodes and one demand
node (Figure 1). We define two FTRs: from node 1 to 3 and from node 2 to 3. Both vary between
1 MW and 10 MW respectively to estimate the resulting global cost function. For the first part of the
analysis we use a greenfield approach: lines reactances are given and fixed and the starting values for 
the line capacities are zero. Thus, for each incremental FTR we must construct the necessary capacity 
amount.
We alter the approach for the second part of our analysis when capacity and reactances are linked. The 
functional connection between capacity extensions and line characteristics Bij(kij) is derived from the 
8 As line resistance values are significantly smaller than the reactance values, only the latter are used within the model,
simplifying the line susceptance to
ij
ij
X
B 1
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laws of parallel circuits.9 We assume that a doubling of capacity results in a bisection of a line
reactance. Thus, starting values for the line capacities kij with a value of zero would result in an 
impossibility of any extension so we select starting values per line that allow a relatively high initial 
level of congestion and that are further reduced in the alternative case. Thus, the initial grid can only 
cover small amounts of FTRs (see Table 1).  To further analyze the impact of loop-flow lines, we use 
a second configuration consisting of a meshed six-node network (Figure 2) and adjust the FTRs
accordingly.
Due to the numerical nature of the model, we cannot make general predictions for cost functions 
applicable to any electricity network configuration, because specific grid configurations will produce 
quite different results. Nevertheless, by applying different scenarios for two different FTRs, we want
to derive the functional behavior of extensions that can support general conclusions. Table 1 gives an
overview of our simulation.
9 In a parallel circuit the total resistance of the system is defined by


i i
total
R
R 1
1 .
Figure 1: Three-node network Figure 2: Six-node network 
n1
Table 1: Scenario overview for cost function calculation 
Fixed line reactances Variable line reactances 
Three-node network 
Considered FTR Range [MW] FTR 1 to 3: 1 to 5 
FTR 2 to 3: 1 to 10 
Considered Line Extension
Functions
linear
quadratic
logarithmic
Considered Line Extension Base values: aij = bij = 1 Base values: aij = bij = 1 
n2line1n1 n3
n4
n5
n6
line2
line2
line3 line4 line5 line6n3
line1 line7
line8 line9
line3
n2
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Functional parameters Asymmetric case: a12 or b12 = 3 Asymmetric case 1: a12 or b12 = 3 
Asymmetric case 2: a23 or b23 = 3 
Starting capacity values [MW] kij = 0 Base values: kij = 2 
Alternative values: kij = 1 
Six node network
Considered FTR Range [MW] FTR 1 to 6: 1 to 5 
FTR 5 to 6: 1 to 10 
Considered Line Extension
Functions
linear
quadratic
logarithmic
Considered Line Extension
Functional parameters
Base values: aij = bij = 1 
Asymmetric case: 
a12 or b12 = 3 
a23 or b23 = 3 
a25 or b25 = 3 
a35 or b35 = 3 
a45 or b45 = 3 
Base values: aij = bij = 1 
Asymmetric case 1:
a12 or b12 = 3 
a23 or b23 = 3 
a25 or b25 = 3 
a35 or b35 = 3 
a45 or b45 = 3 
Asymmetric case 2:
a14 or b14 = 3 
a24 or b24 = 3 
a46 or b46 = 3 
a56 or b56 = 3 
Starting capacity values [MW] kij = 0 Base values: kij = 2 
Alternative values: kij = 1 
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Fixed line reactances
The first part of the cost function analysis only considers the capacity extension while the grid’s
topology is fixed in terms of line reactances and available connections. Varying the FTRs has an 
exogenously determined impact on the power flow pattern. Hence, our model only calculates the 
minimum capacity amount needed to exactly fulfill this pattern. The outcomes therefore resemble the 
loop-flow nature of real-world networks.
In the symmetric three-node case, line 1 (between nodes 1 and 2) is subject to power flows in opposite 
directions depending on the value of the two FTRs. Given a fixed level of one FTR, an increase in the
second FTR will first lead to a decrease in the flow on line 1 towards zero until both FTRs have the 
same value. Afterwards, the flow will again increase, although in the opposite direction. The resulting
cost for increasing the FTR value will show a “kink” at the level of the fixed FTR (Figure 3) that could 
imply some problems. Furthermore, the resulting global cost function for increasing two FTRs
simultaneously shows that the costs when moving from one FTR combination to another can even 
decrease (Figure 4). This result is specific to the decreasing-returns extension function, since the cost
always increases with increasing FTR values for both the linear and quadratic functions. The
asymmetric case easily distinguishes the outcomes because the loop-flows’ cost dependence can be 
represented clearly.
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Figure 3: Cost function, three-node network, FTR 1>3 fixed at 2.5 MW 
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Figure 4: Global cost function, three-node network, logarithmic extension functions 
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Extending our model to six nodes according to the FTR combination subjects five lines to counter-
flows. Since lines 2, 5 and 6 are symmetric, their counter-flows will “kink” at the same level. The 
resulting global cost function can have three kinks according to the FTR combinations. In comparing
the six- and the three-node networks, the quadratic extension function still results in an always-
9
increasing feasibility range while the logarithmic function has a decreasing global cost function 
according to the FTR combination. However, the linear extension function also now has decreasing
elements (Figure 5) in the global costs function, especially when increasing the cost parameters for
loop-flow lines (asymmetric case). In other words, by extending a specific FTR, the simultaneous
increase of further FTRs can reduce the overall costs in meshed networks. However, this will not 
always be achieved because the necessary counter-flow generating FTRs may not be needed and the
positive effect of the additional net injections will not be obtained. 
Figure 5: Global cost function, six-node network, linear extension functions, asymmetric case 
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2.3.2 Variable line reactances 
In reality, there are limitations to extending a line’s capacity without altering its added technical 
characteristics. Normally, a capacity extension is linked to a change in the reactance of the line. 
Therefore, for the second part of our analysis, we assume that doubling a line’s capacity results in a 
reduction of its reactance by the factor 0.5 (based on the law of parallel circuits). We observe that the 
starting values of the lines’ capacities are necessary but that they will prevent making a direct 
comparison to our first approach that uses fixed-line reactances.
Using the simple three-node case and a starting capacity of 2 MW on each line, the resulting cost 
functions do not necessarily have a kink when one FTR is fixed. In addition, all lines start with zero 
extension costs since the first portion of the FTR increase can be accomplished with the existing grid 
(Figure 6). However, the cost function can still have kinks but these do not necessarily relate to a 
specific loop-flowed line. Discontinuities can also be caused by changing grid conditions as the same 
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FTR combination can now be obtained by several different extension measurements e.g. increasing
two line capacities by modest amounts or increase only one line significantly.
The global cost function for extending both FTRs no longer shows a clear correlation with the number
of loop-flowed lines as we observed in the fixed-reactance portion of our analysis. Moreover, all line 
extension functions show decreasing elements for certain FTR combinations (Figure 7). As the
simulation needs starting values for line capacities, an alternative approach with reduced capacities has 
been calculated. However, when decreasing the starting capacity from 2 MW to 1 MW the resulting 
cost functions show a similar behavior. We note that the functions slightly shift to the left and that the 
outcomes of higher FTR levels vary accordingly. 
Increasing the parameters of the costs function of the loop-flowed line will not alter the results. Thus, 
in the optimal solution of the three-node network, we appear to avoid an extension of line 1, but when
we alter the cost parameters of another line, the outcome changes, although the general functional 
form remains similar. The logarithmic extension function yields different results as the trade-off
between extensions of one or two lines becomes more evident (i.e. large extensions are relatively less
expensive).
Figure 6: Cost function, three-node network, FTR 1>3 fixed at 2.5 MW, variable line reactances 
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Figure 7: Global cost function, three-node network, logarithmic extension functions, variable 
line reactances
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FTR 2>3 [MW]
co
st
s
linear quadratic logarithmic
Next, our model is extended to six nodes and nine lines to estimate the impact of more loop-flowed 
lines on the cost functions. As in the three-node simulations, the obtained global cost functions do not
reveal an obvious correlation to the number of loop-flowed lines. The results for linear and quadratic 
extension functions show a generally increasing cost function with a relatively smooth outline;
however the logarithmic extension function results in a global cost function with significant slope 
changes (Figure 8). We note the difficulty in obtaining a consistent solution in the logarithmic case,
resulting in cost spikes which occurred in three of the six scenario runs.10
Comparing the results with the fixed network case shows that the introduction of variable line 
reactances significantly changes the possible outcomes. In particular, for linear or quadratic extension
functions, the introduction of a linkage between capacity and reactance appears to reduce the impact of
loop-flows in terms of significant kinks.
10 Reducing the starting capacity of the lines to 1 MW does not significantly change the results of the linear and quadratic
extension functions. The global cost function in the logarithmic case also resembles the same form but the slope changes are
less pronounced. Likewise, a shifting of the line parameters for loop-flowed and non loop-flowed lines does not alter the
general results although the absolute values differ.
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Figure 8: Global cost function, six-node network, logarithmic extension functions, variable line
reactances
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2.3.3 Conclusion
The results of our cost function analyses reveal the difficulties that electricity networks present when 
applying standard approaches. Even for a simple extension, loop-flows within the system can lead to 
mathematically problematical global cost function behaviors. We observe that the linkage between
capacity extension and line reactances (and thus the flow patterns) produces complex results that are
highly sensitive to the underlying grid structure. None of the three tested extension functions can fully 
reproduce realistic extension structures since these are subject to lumpiness and external influences
(e.g. geographical conditions) that can cause dysfunctional behaviors with sudden slope changes. The 
assumption of linear extension costs is acceptable when considering line length; however with respect
to capacity increase, a lumpy function with constant costs for corresponding voltage levels and circuit 
number is required.
For modeling purposes, the logarithmic behavior appears to produce a high degree of nonlinearities
with non-smooth behavior, and demands more intense calculations and solver capabilities. Quadratic 
functions show a generally continuous behavior that makes them suitable for modeling purposes. 
Linear extension functions fall between the logarithmic and quadratic cases. However, the piecewise,
linear nature of the resulting global costs function makes the derivation of global optima feasible; in 
combination with the advantages of retaining linear functions, this is preferred for modeling purposes 
and is compatible with the realistic extension costs neglecting lumpiness.
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3 The regulatory two-part tariff model 
3.1 Outline
Next we analyze the implementation of the HRV regulatory model to determine if  it can provide 
incentives for efficient expansion. We estimate the impact of different assumptions regarding grid
parameters and topology, again with and without PTDF changes. As in Section 3, we translate the 
HRV theoretical regulatory model (Hogan, Rosellón, and Vogelsang, 2007, pp. 13-19) into an
empirically testable model.
The HRV regulatory model uses FTRs as the definition of output. Using this definition allows us to
link the regulatory logic of a price cap constraint on two-part tariffs of Vogelsang (2001) to the 
merchant model. The HRV model assumes stable costs and demand conditions, and considers the 
repeated application of the incentive mechanism of a myopic Transco optimizing profit in each period. 
Likewise, there are various established agents (generators, Gridcos, marketers, etc.) interested in 
transmission expansion that do not have market power in their respective markets.
A sequence of auctions held at each period t where participants buy and sell LTFTRs, culminates in a 
real time auction at which time all FTRs are cashed out. LTFTRs are assumed to be point-to-point
balanced financial transmission right obligations. The Transco maximizes expected profits at each 
auction subject to simultaneous feasibility constraints and a two-part-tariff cap constraint. The
transmission outputs are the incremental LTFTRs between consecutive periods. Our model first
defines the least cost solution for the network configuration that meets a given demand. For the 
domain where  (i.e., no losses): 0tq 
    * 1 1 1 1
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Kt = available transmission capacity in period t 
Ht = transfer admittance matrix at period t 
t  = a vector of ones 
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 1, , ,t t t tc K K H H 1  is the cost of moving from one configuration to the next. For a DC load
approximation model, the Transco’s profit maximization problem is then given by:
   111
,
,,,)(   ttttttttt
Ft
t HHKKcNFqqMax
tt
 (6)
subject to 
      (7)ttwtttwt NFQNFQ 11   
where:
 t = vector of transmission prices between locations in period t  
Ft = fixed fee in period t 
Nt = number of consumers in period t 
Qw= (qt – qt-1)w
w = type of weight. 
We note that the proposed price cap index (7) is defined for two-part tariffs as a variable fee  and a
fixed fee F where the output is incremental LTFTRs. The weighted number of consumers N
t
t is
assumed to be determined exogenously. When the demand and optimized cost functions are 
differentiated, the first order optimality conditions are: 
      (8)))(()( 1*  twq qqQcq 
3.2 Model approach 
We view this incentive-regulatory mechanism as a maximization problem with complementarity
constraints (MPEC) model that incorporates both a profit-maximizing Transco subject to the two-part
tariff constraint and a perfectly competitive wholesale nodal pricing market. The Transco’s revenue
consists of the collected congestion rents and the fixed part of the tariff, and its expenses are the
network investment costs. By choosing a specific extension level, the Transco has an impact on flow 
patterns and market prices and consequently on its own revenue.
For a first application of the HRV regulatory model we alter our approach to allow for a 
straightforward implementation into GAMS. The objective function of the Transco covers the
collectable congestion rent in terms of point-to-point price differences (pij) in a nodal pricing market
and its fixed fee minus the extension costs for the grid:
   
t
tttt
ij
t
ij
Fk
ijkcNFqp
,
max     (9)
The sum of the variable and fixed revenues is subject to a Laspeyere weighted price cap as proposed in 
equation (7). The time horizon is assumed to be ten periods. The first period is considered to define the
starting values for the price cap and no extension measurements are allowed in. We also assume that
11 'q' refers to net injections of the form qi, while the FTRs are of the form qij. The FTRs form a matrix Q = [qij]
so that the vector of net injections is q = Qe, where e is a unit vector. Since we are assuming that FTRs are point-
to-point obligations, we can indirectly use net injections or FTRs as outputs (see Hogan, 2002b).
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the starting value of F has an impact on the outcome by allowing the Transco a higher starting basis
for grid extensions. 
The Transco’s maximization problem is subject to a market equilibrium that defines the outcome of 
the nodal pricing market. We assume a welfare maximizing ISO that balances demand and generation, 
given network constraints: 
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where
t = time period 
di = demand at node i
p(di) = linear price function at node i 
gi = generation at node i 
Pij = real power flow between i and j 
Demand and generation result in pairs of net inputs (qi and qj) that translate into specific FTRs
between these nodes. Power flows are again calculated based on the DC-Load-Flow approach
following equation (4). The power-flow welfare maximization problem is transformed into an
equilibrium problem by deriving the first order conditions of the Lagrange formulation and their dual
variables respectively. The wholesale market therefore is assumed to be fully competitive and the only 
influence that the Transco has on the market outcome is to decide on the extensions of existing lines. 
Similar to the cost function analysis, we use a three-node network to test the HRV regulatory model
for a fixed-PTDF grid and then for a linkage of line capacities and reactances. To mathematically
simplify the analysis, we introduce linear demand functions at each node with a slope of -1 and a 
maximum demand of 10 at a price of 0. We assume that node 3 depends on the grid for supply.
Generation capacities at nodes 1 and 2 are assumed to be unrestricted and have no marginal generation 
costs. Thus the demand at these nodes should always be at maximum level and supplied by local
generation.
Since the first period defines the price cap, we expect that the results strongly depend on the chosen 
starting conditions, in particular the starting capacities of the lines. To test the impact of the starting 
conditions we also consider a second approach using asymmetric generation costs. Table 2
summarizes the calculated scenarios.
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Table 2: Scenario overview for MPEC model 
Fixed line reactances Variable line reactances 
Time periods t = 10 
Demand function at i p(di) = 10 - di
Considered Line Extension
Functions
linear
quadratic
logarithmic
Considered Line Extension
Functional parameters
aij = bij = 1 
cij = 0 
Starting capacity values Base values: kij = 2 
Alternative values: kij = 1 
Generation costs at i Base values: ci = 0 
Alternative values: c1 = 1 
Starting value for fixed tariff
part in t1
Base values: Ft1 = 0 
Alternative values: Ft1 = 20 
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Fixed line reactances
When using symmetric generation facilities, the obtained results of linear, quadratic, and logarithmic
extension functions do not differ significantly in the fixed network. Prices at node 1 and 2 stay at zero 
thus equaling the marginal generation costs. The price at node 3 starts from either 6 €/MWh or 
8 €/MWh depending on the starting line capacities and drops to about 5 €/MWh for all of the 
remaining periods. With the exception of the quadratic function, only one extension measurement is 
undertaken in period 2. In the quadratic case, extensions take place in each period although strongly
decreasing in absolute values. However, the sum of the extended capacity is nearly equal for all three
extension cases.12
For the asymmetric case, the results differ when we change the cost parameters of generation. The
price at node 1 remains at its marginal costs level for all scenarios. In other words, the modeled
Transco has no incentive to increase line capacities to allow for a price reduction due to the cheaper
generation at node 2. Prices at node 3 again change according to the extended capacities The quadratic
extension function still results in a generally decreasing extension over all periods. The linear and 
logarithmic functions result in one, two or three price jumps and related extension measurements. The 
price at node 3 can drop to as low a value of 2 €/MWh for some of the scenarios. The total sum of
extensions therefore is not constant as in the symmetric case, which could be a result of the greater
non linearity resulting from asymmetric generation and non smooth extension functions. As time is not 
accounted for at full economic scale within the model the Transco is indifferent about revenues in 
12 It is not evident why the quadratic case shows a significant different behavior than the other two cases. A further non-
intuitive result is that increasing the starting value for the fixed-part of the tariff does not alter the results.
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present or future periods which might influence the obtained results. Again, introducing a starting
fixed- part of the tariff does not alter the general outcome. 
3.3.2 Variable line reactances 
Under base case conditions with 2 MW starting line capacities, symmetric generation, and no fixed-
part of the tariff, the resulting price and extension patterns in the first period resemble the expectations
of a price decrease towards marginal costs. While prices tend towards marginal generation cost due to 
increasing line extensions, the loss of congestion rent is compensated for by increasing the returns of
the fixed-part of the tariff (Figure 9). The results for linear and logarithmic extension functions show 
only small differences whereas the quadratic case has a slightly different functional form towards the
last periods with a further steady decrease. Reducing the starting capacity does not vary the results 
although the absolute values differ. The extension schedule for the quadratic case is symmetric for all 
periods. By contrast for linear and logarithmic extension functions, the values are chiefly symmetric or 
focuson the capacity of a single one line.
Introducing asymmetric generation costs leads to a significant divergence in the functional form of the 
quadratic extension case whereas the other two extensions cases remain rather stable (Figure 10). The
price at node 1 with its higher marginal generation costs and the price at node 2 decrease. In the linear 
and logarithmic cases the price at node 2 moves towards 0 starting in period 3. In the quadratic case 
the price decrease starts in period 7 but also reaches 0 in period 10. Altering the starting value of the
fixed-part of the tariff does not change the results again and decreasing the starting capacity changes
the absolute value but not the general behavior. The extension schedule of the quadratic case is more
consistent since it continuously extends lines 1 and 2. In the linear and logarithmic extension cases,
capacities increase with the larger amounts in the first periods which explains the divergence of the 
price figures. The total amount of extension is similar in all three cases.
The major difference between the static and variable line reactances is the non-existent price 
movement in the first case. Furthermore, the fixed-part of the tariff is not altered during the periods.
Thus the Transco extends only to prevent changes in the initial congestion rent value even though 
more energy is transmitted. The missing possibility of changing the grid’s flow pattern in effect limits
the Transco’s choices to the observed ones. In reality, capacity extension is generally linked to 
changes in a network’s flow characteristics, making the second part of our analysis particularly
relevant. Altering the original postulated myopic assumption of the Transco may also bias the results. 
A Transco that maximizes repeatedly in one period may have very different incentives from one that 
considers all periods. However, a periodic approach may still be more appropriate.13
13 One must bear in mind the complexity of solving MPEC and the high degree of nonlinearity in the used functions. The 
resulting non-smooth behavior increases the possibility that the obtained solutions are local optima.
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Figure 9: Variable part of the tariff price at node 3 and fixed-part of the tariff, variable line 
reactances, and symmetric generation 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
time period
pr
ic
e 
at
no
de
 3
[€
/M
W
h]
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
fix
ed
 ta
rif
f p
ar
t[
€]
price linear price quadratic price logarithmic
fixed linear fixed quadratic fixed logarithmic
Figure 10: Variable part of the tariff at node 3 and fixed-part of the tariff, variable line
reactances, and asymmetric generation
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4 Application to a European Network
4.1 Outline
We now test the theoretical insights obtained. Figure 11 illustrates a simplified grid connecting 
Germany, the Benelux, and France as presented in Ehrenmann et al. (2006). The modeled market is 
designed as a nodal pricing system, characterized by high prices in the Benelux, intermediate prices in 
Germany, and relatively low prices in France. The simplified transmission network gives a good
“snapshot” of the European market’s congestion problems.
Figure 11: Simplified grid of North West Europe
4.2 Model and Data 
Our model’s mathematical implementation follows the approach presented in Section 3.2 with variable 
line reactances. The only difference is the introduction of plant types to differentiate several plants at
one node i. We adjust the dataset to represent the simplified network of 15 nodes and 28 lines. The
nodes connecting France and Germany with their neighbors are auxiliary nodes without associated 
demand or generation. The lines connecting the German and French nodes with these auxiliary nodes 
are assumed to have unlimited capacities, and the Transco is not permitted to extend them. Each 
country node has given generation capacities and a reference demand level. For additional 
simplification, we classify generation capacities by eight types and assume an equal marginal cost
level for each type in all countries. Table 3 gives an overview of the types, installed capacities, and
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marginal generation costs. A linear demand behavior at one node is derived from the average load 
level and an assumed price elasticity of -0.25. 
The line extension costs are assumed to behave linearly. Following Brakelmann (2004) and DENA
(2005), we choose a value of 100 € per km per MW. This value is derived from upgrade costs for 
additional lines of the same voltage level, and upgrades from 220 kV to 380 kV (in reality, network 
investments are lumpy; adding one more line adds a specific amount of capacity to the system). The
derived results for one time period represent one hour; thus the obtained Transco revenue is multiplied
by 8760 for each of the 10 periods to resemble yearly incomes. Due to the average nature of both the 
load level and the generation structure, our model omits the variable nature of real-world electricity
systems.
The starting conditions in the market are classified by a high price level in the Netherlands (Krim,
Mass, Zwol), a divided price structure in Belgium (Grim, Merc), modest prices in Germany, and low
prices in France. Thus, congestion occurs between Belgium and France, as well as between Germany
and the Netherlands. 
Table 3: Plant characteristics
Plant type 
Installed
capacity
Marginal
generation
cost
Plant type 
Installed
capacity
Marginal
generation
cost
Nuclear 83 500 GW 10 €/MWh Steam 28 000 GW 45 €/MWh
Lignite 21 000 GW 15 €/MWh Gas turbine 5 500 GW 60 €/MWh
Coal 51 250 GW 18 €/MWh Hydro 17 000 GW 0 €/MWh 
CCGT 18 500 GW 35 €/MWh Pumped
storage
13 000 GW 28 €/MWh
4.3 Results
We modeled a ten-period run and achieve an extensive network extension program that leads to price 
convergence at the marginal costs level of coal units (Figure 12). The fixed-part of the tariff increases
in a similar fashion to the cases presented in Section 3.3.2. The Transco’s profit increases during the
periods, starting at 950 mn € per year, and reaching 2.5 bn € in the last period. Thus the chosen 
Laspeyres weights allow a significant revenue increase for the Transco. 
The extension amount totals an additional 14.2 GW, or nearly 43% of the system’s initial line 
capacity. The relatively low total investment of about 140 mn is explained by our assumption that the 
extension cost functions represent system upgrades only and no new connections are built. The
geographic extent of the extensions (Figure 13) resembles expectations drawn from the nodal price 
differences, particularly between France and Belgium. However, some of the measures appear to 
represent necessary back-up extensions to allow for specific flow patterns between France and
Germany and within Germany.
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The consumer surplus in the system also changes according to the price development. Due to the large 
demand levels in France which faces higher prices after the extensions, the surplus decreases by 1%. 
We observe that although the overall congestion nearly vanishes, the increased consumer surplus in
the Benelux is insufficient to offset the decrease in France. However, looking at the social welfare 
including consumer and producer surplus of the wholesale market, we see an increase of 1.7% (equal
to almost 1.6 bn € annually).
These preliminary results show that our mechanism has the potential to foster investment in congested
networks in a welfare-improving direction. However, more analysis is necessary to estimate the
impact of externalities (e.g. wind input and generation extensions) on the Transco’s behavior.
Furthermore, the extension functions and restrictions must be adjusted to more completely reflect real
conditions, especially the lumpiness of investments. These adjustments may result in serious modeling
problems due to the non-linear and non-smooth nature of the impacts. Political and administrative
issues to be addressed include property-right issues and existing, long-term transaction contracts. 
Figure 12: Price development in the European model 
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Figure 13: Geographical price structure of the model
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5 Conclusions
This paper presents a combination of the merchant-FTR and the regulatory approaches to transmission
expansion in a competitive environment of price-taking generators and loads. We are interested in the
application of incentive mechanisms and their compatibility with merchant investment in organized 
electricity markets with FTRs. 
The paper discusses three distinct topics and our preliminary results. First, the general cost function 
behavior in electricity networks is analyzed. Due to the loop-flow nature of meshed networks, a high 
level of complexity, non linearity and discontinuities exist. We apply increasing, linear, and 
decreasing extension functions for lines within a network in order to derive the global cost function
when increasing the FTR in the system. The results indicate that the high level of kinks resulting from 
loop-flows on lines diminishes when line capacity extensions are linked to line reactances (i.e.
changing the flow pattern within the network whenever it is extended). However, the resulting global
cost functions still show a high level of nonlinearity, and complicating the derivation of global optima 
in model approaches. 
Second we implement a regulatory mechanism as an MPEC problem with a profit maximizing
Transco and a fully competitive wholesale market based on nodal pricing. Starting with a congested 
grid, the Transco is free to choose grid extensions that influence its own profit (the congestion rent and 
a fixed fee). The Transco’s profits are subject to a price cap with Laspeyres weights. The results show
that the Transco extends the network and that prices converge towards marginal costs over the periods. 
Third, we test the MPEC approach using the simplified grid of Northwestern Europe with a realistic
generation structure. This first application of the HRV mechanism to a real world situation yields
outcomes similar to our theoretical simulated analyses; the nodal prices that were subject to a high 
23
level of congestion in the first phase converge towards a common price level representing the marginal
generation costs.
We suggest that additional analyses are necessary to verify the obtained results and general 
conclusions presented. At a minimum, they should include improving the underlying model structure 
with respect to myopic behavior; varying the  weights in the price-cap constraint; altering the time
periods; employing variable pricing mechanisms (particularly zonal pricing); and examining the 
impacts of additional Transcos within one network.
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